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Abstract
We examine policy instruments that aim to decarbonize electricity production by
replacing fossil fuel energy by intermittent renewable sources, namely wind and solar
power. We consider a model of investment, production and storage with two sources of
energy: one is clean but intermittent (wind or solar), whereas the other one is reliable but
polluting (thermal power). We first determine the first-best energy mix depending on the
social cost of polluting emissions. We then show that, to implement the socially efficient
energy mix without a carbon tax, feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards must
be complemented with a price cap and volume-limited capacity payments.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Intermittent and reliable energy sources
Electricity production from fossil energy sources is one of the main causes of anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions. The electricity sector plays a pivotal role in the debate about
climate change mitigation. Public policies have been launched worldwide to decarbonize
electricity production by switching to renewable sources of energy, such as wind and solar
power, instead of fossil-fuels. Various instruments have been adopted to support renewables.
Some states in the USA have opted for quantitative commitments, renewable portfolio stan-
dards (RPS) that require a given proportion of electricity demand to be met by renewable
sources.1 By contrast, most European countries have opted for a price instrument, feed-in
tariffs (FIT), that consist in purchasing renewable-generated electricity at a price fixed well
above the wholesale price. The price difference is generally covered by a tax charged to
electricity consumers.2
Integrating renewable energy such as wind and solar power into the electricity mix is not
easy. One reason is that, unlike conventional power units, electricity produced from wind
turbines and photovoltaic panels varies over time and weather conditions. The supply of
electricity from these sources is not controllable and is hard to predict as weather conditions
are rarely forecast more than five days ahead.3 The intermittency of electricity supplied
from wind turbines and solar photovoltaic panels makes power dispatching more challenging
because electricity must be produced at the very same time it is consumed. Supply must thus
match demand in real time, whereas the price signals do not change so quickly. Even though
wholesale electricity prices vary with electricity provision every hour or half-hour, the retail
prices that consumers pay do not. And even if prices could vary with weather conditions to
reflect the supply of intermittent sources of energy (e.g. with the use of “smart meters”),
1Since 2007, the US House of Representatives has twice passed bills to make a nationwide RPS pro-
gram mandatory (Schmalensee 2012). Information about RPS requirements and renewable portfolio goals is
available on the Environmental Protection Agency website: https://www.epa.gov/statelocalenergy/energy-
and-environment-guide-action
2FITs have been quite successful in fostering investment in wind and solar power in the European Union
over the past decade. The price paid for success is an increase in the consumers’ bill to cover the cost of
FITs. How much it costs consumers depends on whether suppliers can pass the additional cost through to
their customers. In France, where the entire FIT is billed to final customers, subsidies for green technologies
account for 10% of the electricity bill, and are continuously increasing.
3See for instance Newbery (2011) for empirical evidence.
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consumers would not be able to quickly respond to price changes.
Surprisingly, a number of influential papers presenting economic models of the transition to
low-carbon energy ignore intermittency. Seminal papers deal with a carbon-free technology
that replaces polluting ones at a cost that decreases over time (Fischer and Newell, 2008;
Acemoglu et al., 2012; Fullerton and Heutel, 2010). In these models, carbon-free energy can
be used anytime once production capacity is installed. In reality, intermittency modifies the
availability of energy from wind energy converters and solar panels. It changes the business
model of the electricity sector, production and consumption patterns, as well as investment
in all types of equipment. This, in turn, can be expected to influence the design of public
policy for decarbonizing energy.
This paper fills the gap by analyzing the transition to a decarbonized energy mix in
a model of electricity provision with both intermittent and reliable energy sources. The
supply of electricity from the climate-dependent technology is environment friendly, whereas
reliable sources emit pollutants. On the demand side, most consumers are not reactive to
short-term price variations. Without energy storage, and assuming that power cuts are not
acceptable, the non-reactiveness of consumers makes it necessary to back up energy supplies
from renewable sources with energy from polluting thermal sources of production. It therefore
impacts investment in production capacity, energy use, electricity provision, environmental
pollution and welfare. By explicitly modeling intermittency, we are able to analyze important
features of the energy transition such as the need for backing up renewables with thermal
power capacity, the role of demand response to volatile electricity prices, and the social value
of energy storage.4
With this model, we first characterize the efficient energy mix when consumers cannot
react to real-time price changes and producers have the obligation to serve them.5 We also
4Note that intermittency is both a matter of dates and one of states of nature. Solar photovoltaic panels
produce during the day and not at night, and their diurnal production intensity varies with cloud cover. Wind
power is seasonal in most regions, and the wind speed results from differences in pressure, themselves caused
by differences in temperature. In our paper, we do not distinguish between dates (e.g. day/night) and states
of nature (e.g. high/low temperature). Only one variable will be used to identify the time or randomness
dimension of production from renewables. Dates and occurrences of availability obey a given frequency or
probability distribution. For convenience, we will mainly refer to the wind resource and its randomness.
However, when addressing the problem of storage, we will show that the model can be interpreted in terms
of the frequency of periods, which better corresponds to solar production.
5Note that rationing and disconnections are also a solution to intermittency. However, in developed
countries, strict legal rules require ’keeping the lights on’, that is, security of supply with very large probability,
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discuss its decentralization in competitive electricity markets with a Pigouvian carbon tax.
We highlight three effects of intermittency on electricity generation. First, since each kilowatt
of turbine capacity is supplied with wind only a fraction of the year, the average cost of one
more kilowatt is the unit capital cost divided by the frequency of production. This means
that if wind turbines are spinning say half of the year, the cost of a kilowatt-hour from wind
power is doubled. Second, decarbonating further electricity provision does not always mean
substituting thermal power with renewables. It sometimes requires to reduce both thermal and
renewable production. As a consequence, a higher carbon tax might reduce the price of clean
energy instead of increasing it, thereby lowering investment in wind or solar power. Third, the
final bill should include the cost of thermal power or storage equipment used as a back-up,
because electricity consumption is determined not by wholesale prices but by retail prices
which reflect the social cost of the reliable provision of energy. From a policy perspective,
the extra cost of intermittency and back-up should be included in the cost-benefit analysis of
renewables mandates.6
Next, we analyze FIT and RPS as policy instruments to implement the efficient energy mix
for a given decarbonization target. Both instruments enhance the penetration of renewables
into the energy mix. However, they induce too much electricity production and investment in
thermal power as compared to first best, then excessive emissions of greenhouse gas. Thermal
power production and capacity can be lowered by a tax on electricity consumption or fossil
fuels to implement first-best.7 Similarly, first-best can be implemented with FIT (or RPS) by
capping electricity price and subsidizing thermal power production capacity (for example with
capacity payments or markets). Storage facilities have also to be subsidized when efficient
if thermal power plants are active. If not, excluding fossil fuel energy from the energy mix
would induce efficient investment in storage with FIT (or RPS).
1.2 Related literature
Several papers have introduced intermittency in an economic model of electricity provision.
Ambec and Crampes (2012) analyze the optimal and market-based electricity mix with inter-
mittent sources of energy. However, they do not consider public policies and environmental
e.g. only 3 hours a year of failure, which represents a probability of 8757/8760 = 99, 96% for matching demand.
6The cost of intermittency has been estimated for renewable penetration of less than 20%, see Heptonstall
et al. 2017 for a meta-analysis.
7In particular, a tax on electricity consumption that only finances the FIT is not high enough to obtain
the efficient energy mix. Alternatively, the FIT adapted to the efficient mix raises more money than what is
strictly necessary to balance the industry costs.
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externalities.8 In the same vein, Helm and Mier (2016) investigate optimal and market-based
investment in several intermittent sources of energy. They assume that consumers adapt their
consumption to real-time changes in electricity prices. As a consequence, they find that it
is optimal to exit from fossil energy when renewables are competitive enough. In contrast,
when consumers do not instantaneously modify their consumption pattern to react to whole-
sale electricity prices, as assumed in our model, fossil energy is always used as a back-up,
which increases the social cost of renewables. Similarly, in their investigation of the impact
of FIT on the energy mix, Green and Le´autier (2015) ignore the problem of consumers’ reac-
tivity to wholesale electricity prices. In their model, there is no need to back up renewables
with reliable sources, which eventually disappear when the FIT becomes high enough. The
issue of consumers’ sensitivity to real-time electricity prices has been addressed by Joskow
and Tirole (2007). They introduce non-reactive consumers in a model of electricity provision
with variable demand. In contrast, in our model, the source of variability is on the supply
side and the degree of variability is endogenously determined by investment in intermittent
power through the support to renewables.9
Rubin and Babcock (2013) rely on simulations to quantify the impact of various pricing
mechanisms - including FIT - on wholesale electricity markets. We take a different approach
here: we analytically solve a normative model and make a welfare comparison of several policy
instruments. Garcia, Alzate and Barrera (2012) introduce RPS and FIT in a stylized model
of electricity production with an intermittent source of energy. Yet they assume an inelastic
demand and a regulated price cap. In contrast, in our paper price is endogenous. More
precisely, we consider a standard increasing and concave consumers’ surplus function which
leads to a demand for electricity that smoothly decreases in price. Our framework is more
appropriate for analyzing long-term decisions concerning investment in generation capacity
since in the long run smart equipment will improve demand flexibility. It furthermore allows
for welfare comparisons in which consumers’ surplus and environmental damage are included.
Another strand of literature relies on local solar and wind energy data to compute the
social value of intermittent renewables. Cullen (2013) estimates the pollution emission offset
by wind power in Texas taking into account intermittency. Kaffine and McBee (2017) perform
a similar estimation for CO2 emissions using high-frequency generation data from the US
Southwest Power Pool. In the same vein, Gowrisankaran et al. (2016) quantify the cost of
8See also Rouillon (2015) and Baranes et al. (2017) for similar analysis.
9In the same vein, two studies have identified the social the value of making consumers reactive to real-time
electricity prices: Le´autier (2014) with variable demand and Ambec and Crampes (2017) with variable supply
(i.e. intermittent renewables).
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solar power in Arizona in an optimized energy mix. Our paper complements this literature
by identifying the key ingredients that determine the social value of intermittent renewables,
both in an optimized and in a market-based electricity sector constrained by public policy. For
instance, we show that the social value includes the cost saved from installing or maintaining
fewer thermal power plants only when the share of renewables is high enough, i.e., above a
threshold that we characterize. Similarly, we are able to identify in our model the social value
of energy storage and how it is related to the cost of wind or thermal power.
Our paper also contributes to the policy debate on capacity mechanisms. To mitigate
the so-called “missing money” problem, several countries have started subsidizing generation
capacity, either by setting a payment per mega-watt (capacity payments) or by auctioning the
option to supply power capacity (capacity markets). Economists have rationalized capacity
markets with the exercise of market power: if prices are capped to mitigate market power,
producers may need to be subsidized to induce optimal investment (Cramton et al. 2013,
Fabra, 2017). Our paper provides another economic rationale for both price caps and capacity
markets: combining the two instruments allows to limit thermal power production when
intermittent renewables are pushed by FIT or RPS. The two instruments are necessary: price
cap to avoid over-production and capacity mechanism to control investment in thermal power
equipment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
characterizes the first-best energy mix when consumers are not reactive to climate-dependent
prices and energy storage is not profitable (3.2) or is profitable (3.3). It also identifies the
market outcome prices and the impact of intermittency on production, emissions, and invest-
ment in power generation. Public policies are analyzed in Section 4: feed-in tariff alone in
Section 4.1 and FIT complemented by capacity mechanisms in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. Section
5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model of energy production and supply with intermittent energy and non-price
reactive demand.10 Electricity can be produced by means of two technologies.
One is a fully controlled but polluting technology (e.g. plants burning coal, oil or gas). It
has the capacity to produce qf kilowatt-hours at a unit operating cost c as long as production
does not exceed the installed capacity, Kf . The unit cost of capacity is rf . This source of
10The model is a generalization of Ambec and Crampes (2012), with heterogeneous production costs for
wind or solar power, energy storage and explicit pollution damage.
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electricity will be named the “fossil”source. It emits air pollutants which cause damages to
society. We focus on greenhouse gases, mostly CO2, even though our analysis could encompass
other air pollutants such as SO2, NOx or particulate matters. Let us denote by δ > 0 the
environmental marginal damage due to thermal power, i.e., the social damage from CO2
emissions per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated.
The second technology relies on an intermittent primary energy source, e.g. wind. It
makes it possible to produce qi kWh at zero cost as long as (i) qi is smaller than the installed
capacity Ki and, (ii) the primary energy is available, e.g. wind is blowing. We assume
two states of nature: “with” and “without” intermittent energy. The state of nature with
(respectively without) intermittent energy occurs with frequency ν (respectively 1 − ν) and
state-dependent variables are identified by the superscript w (respectively w¯). The total
potential capacity that can be installed is K¯. The cost of installing new capacity is ri per
kilowatt. It varies depending on technology and location (weather conditions, proximity to
consumers, etc.) in the range [ri,+∞] according to the density function f and the cumulative
function F . To keep the model simple, we assume that investing in new intermittent capacity
has no effect on the probability of occurrence of state w, which depends only on the frequency
of windy days or sunny hours. Investing only increases the amount of energy produced in
state w. This assumption can be relaxed by allowing for more states of nature, that is by
changing the occurrence of intermittent energy from several sources.11
A third technology called storage does not produce electricity. It allows to store energy
when production is cheap (in state w in our model) to supply electricity when it is expensive
(in state w¯).12 Energy storage capacity Ks (measured in kilowatt-hours) is installed at unit
cost rs. Let s
w be the power used to store energy in state w. The storage facility leads to
sw¯ more power supplied in state w¯. The relationship between these two flows on one hand
and between the flows and the storage capacity on the other hand depends on the type of
storage technology.13 We choose to measure the storage capacity Ks in terms of saved energy
11See Ambec and Crampes (2012), Section 4.
12Nowadays, storage is mainly done by using cheap electricity from coal or nuclear plants to pump water up
into reservoirs. At periods of scarce energy, this water is turbinated to complement the expensive electricity
produced by peaking units. In our model with one single type of plant burning fossil fuel at a constant
operating cost, given conversion losses it would be inefficient to store energy produced by thermal plants. For
an economic analysis of water storage and pumping, see Crampes and Moreaux (2010). Ambec and Doucet
(2003) study water storage under imperfect competition.
13Storage is a dynamic process, whereas the model we use in this paper is static. However, we can obtain
enlightening results by reframing as follows: electricity consumption is defined for a unit of time equal to
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(inflow).14 The parameters ν and 1 − ν are observed frequencies (rather than probabilities)
of states w and w¯ respectively. We have that νsw ≤ Ks. A share 1− λ of the energy injected
into the storage plant is lost15, so that outflow and inflow are related by (1− ν) sw ≤ λνsw.
Since there is no randomness in the storage activity, and building a storage plant is costly, it
would be inefficient to install an oversized plant and to waste the stored energy. Therefore,
we can set that the three variables Ks, s
w and sw¯ are linked by the two equalities:
λ−1 (1− ν) sw¯ = νsw = Ks. (1)
To keep in line with the current state of technologies, we assume that rs is large compared
with rf and λ still too low, so that storage can be part of the optimal mix only when the
environmental cost δ reaches very high levels.
Consumers derive a gross utility S(q) from the consumption of q kilowatt-hour of electric-
ity. Consumption is defined over a unit of time equal to the full cycle of energy storage, e.g.
a day for solar power. Utility is a continuous derivable function with S ′ > 0 and S ′′ < 0. The
inverse demand for electricity is therefore P (q) = S ′(q) and the direct demand function is
D(p) = S ′−1(p) where p stands for the retail price. It does not vary with the states of nature.
By contrats, wholesale electricity prices are weather dependent: pw and pw¯ will denote the
price of one kilowatt-hour of electricity in the wholesale market in states w and w¯ respec-
tively. The retail and wholesale electricity prices are related by the zero profit condition for
electricity retailers implied by the assumption of free entry in the retail market. Neglecting
the operation costs of retailers, the retail price of one kilowatt-hour of electricity sold to non-
reactive consumers is equal to its expected price in the wholesale market p = νpw +(1−ν)pw¯.
All along the paper, we assume that electricity cannot be transported or curtailed. The only
way to balance supply and demand is then to rely on production adjustment, storage and/or
a cycle of energy storage/release rather than for one hour. For example, in the case of solar power from
PV panels, energy is stored during daytime and released during the night. Therefore the unit of time for
consumption is the day (24 hours). The length of the cycle varies with weather conditions and forecasts. For
wind power, it is a matter of weeks or even seasons. For an overview of electricity storage characteristics, see
Crampes and Trochet (2019).
14Alternatively, one can measure capacity in terms of energy for final consumption (outflow), i.e. after
subtracting energy losses.
15For pumped storage, λ ' .75. More general assumptions on storage costs could be considered, e.g. convex
(quadratic) costs. We make the linear assumption, to be able to pin down easily the benefit and cost of
storage.
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price variation. Lastly, we assume that
S ′(0) > c+ rf + δ (2)
In words, producing electricity from fossil energy is socially efficient when it is the only
production source.
In Section 3, we determine the optimal energy mix and in Section 4 we analyze the impact
of public policy.
3 Optimal energy mix with non-reactive consumers
3.1 Capacity, production and prices
The optimal energy mix is defined by capacities for each energy source Ki and Kf , of storage
Ks, and outputs in each state of nature for each energy source. We denote by q
h
j electricity
production in state h ∈ {w, w¯}, for energy source j ∈ {f, i}.
We first state a series of intuitive results that do not necessitate a formal proof: (i)
by definition, in state w¯, no intermittent energy is produced: qw¯i = 0; (ii) since thermal
power equipments are costly, they are used at full capacity if no wind qw¯f = Kf ; (iii) since
intermittent energy has no operating cost, all the energy produced by renewables (if any)
will be supplied to consumers, qwi = Ki ; (iv) the more efficient spots for wind power will
be equipped first; therefore, denoting by r˜i ≥ ri the cost of the last installed wind energy
converter, the installed capacity of wind power is Ki = K¯F (r˜i).
Second, we set up an implication of the constant retail price. Since the price paid by
consumers does not vary with the state of nature, electricity consumption is the same in
states w and w¯. Prohibiting blackouts, electricity supply should be the same, meaning that:
Ki + q
w
f − sw = Kf + sw¯.
Using (1), we can express the above relationship in terms of storage capacity Ks:
Ki + q
w
f −
Ks
ν
= Kf +
λKs
1− ν (3)
We call (3) the non-reactivity constraint as it is an implication of the consumers’ inability
to react to the variations of wholesale electricity prices. Given (3) and the above statements
(i)-(iv), we are left with four decision variables Kf , r˜i, Ks and q
w
f that must be chosen to
maximize the expected social surplus:
ν
[
S
(
K¯F (r˜i) + q
w
f −
Ks
ν
)
− (c+ δ)qwf
]
+ (1− ν)
[
S
(
Kf +
λKs
1− ν
)
− (c+ δ)Kf
]
9
−K¯
∫ r˜i
ri
ridF (ri)− rfKf − rsKs
subject to the constraints:
K¯F (r˜i) + q
w
f −
Ks
ν
= Kf +
λKs
1− ν (4)
qwf ≥ 0 (5)
qwf ≤ Kf (6)
r˜i ≥ ri (7)
Kf ≥ 0 (8)
Ks ≥ 0 (9)
The first constraint is the non-reactivity constraint (3) expressed in terms of the remaining
decision variables. It requires to supply the same quantity of electricity in the two states of
nature. The second constraint requires that electricity production from fossil fuel in state w
be non-negative, and the third constraint precludes it from exceeding production capacity.
The fourth constraint (7) states that the threshold capacity cost r˜i is bounded downward by
the lowest cost ri. Finally, the last two constraints (8) and (9) state that thermal power and
storage capacity cannot be negative.
In order to limit the number of propositions, we include in the definition of first-best the
prices that decentralize the optimal energy mix in a perfect competition framework with free
entry and a Pigouvian carbon tax δ per kilowatt-hour. Prices are defined by the zero-profit
condition for the last entrant in both types of production technology (thermal and renewable),
storage and retailing. The revenues from the carbon tax paid by consumers are redistributed
in a non-distortionary way among consumers and producers.
Solving the above program, we obtain the following Proposition that relates the optimal
energy mix and market prices to the social cost of carbon δ. There are four thresholds
δb, δc, δd, δe defined in Appendix A with the proof of the Proposition.
Proposition 1 :
The optimal levels of capacity, output and price are such that:
(a) no intermittent energy: if δ < δb
Ki = 0, Kf = D(c+ rf + δ) = q
w
f , Ks = 0
pw = c+ δ, pw¯ = c+ δ +
rf
1−ν , p = c+ rf + δ
(b) both renewables and fossil in state w : if δb ≤ δ ≤ δc,
10
Ki = K¯F (r˜
b
i ), Kf = D(c+ rf + δ), q
w
f = Kf −Ki > 0, Ks = 0
with r˜bi = ν (c+ δ)
pw = c+ δ, pw¯ = c+ δ +
rf
1−ν , p = c+ rf + δ
(c) only intermittent energy in state w : if δc ≤ δ ≤ δd,
K¯F (r˜ci ) = Kf = D(r˜
c
i + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf ), qwf = 0, Ks = 0
pw =
r˜ci
ν
, pw¯ = c+ δ +
rf
1−ν , p = r˜
c
i + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf
(d) renewables in state w, storage and thermal power in state w¯: if δd < δ < δe
Ki = K¯F (r˜
d
i ), Kf = Ki −
[
1
ν
+ λ
1−ν
]
Ks, q
w
f = 0,
Ks =
1
ν
[
Ki −D
(
(1− ν (1− λ)) [c+ δ + rf
1−ν
]− νrs)]
with r˜di = λν
[
c+ δ +
rf
1−ν
]− νrs
pw =
r˜di
ν
, pw¯ = c+ δ +
rf
1−ν = λ
−1
[
r˜di
ν
+ rs
]
, p = r˜di + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf .
(e) mix of renewables and storage: if δe ≤ δ,
Ki = K¯F (r˜
e
i ), Kf = 0 = q
w
f , Ks = Ki
ν(1−ν)
1−ν+λν
with r˜ei given by K¯F (r˜
e
i ) =
[
1 + 1−ν
λν
]
D
(
r˜ei
(
1 + 1−ν
λν
)
+ 1−ν
λ
rs
)
pw =
r˜ei
ν , p
w¯ = λ−1
[
r˜ei
ν + rs
]
, p = r˜ei + (1− ν)λ−1
[
r˜ei
ν + rs
]
,
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 below.16 We now comment Proposition
1 and Figures 1 and 2 by considering successively the energy mix without and with energy
storage.
3.2 Energy mix without storage
3.2.1 Optimal quantities
Given our hypothesis of high rs compared with rf and ri, storage is not socially profitable for
low values of δ.
In case (a) (left part of Figure 1), since c+ δ <
ri
ν the cost of carbon is too small to justify
an investment in renewables.17 In both states of nature, thermal plants are the only providers
16All the lines in Figures 1 and 2 are drawn as straight whereas in some of the cases the functions depicted
are not linear.
17This is because we have assumed
ri
ν > c. Otherwise, given δ > 0, there would be no case (a): some
investment in wind technology would always be profitable because of very low capacity costs ri, and/or very
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Figure 1: Capacity, production and consumption when the social cost of carbon varies
of energy. The optimal capacity is the one that equates the marginal surplus S
′
(Kf ) with the
full marginal cost c+ rf + δ. A small increase in the environmental cost δ provokes a decrease
in investment, production and consumption.
For higher values of δ, we switch to case (b) where windmill operators become competitive
since now c + δ >
ri
ν . However, entry is limited because the cost ri is increasing with Ki.
18
Then the merit order in state w begins with renewables, up to the point where r˜iν = c + δ,
followed by fossil-fueled electricity qwf . To meet the non-reactivity requirement q
w
f +Ki = Kf ,
in period w the thermal plants are not fully used: qwf = Kf. −Ki < Kf . Again, the installed
capacity is determined by S
′
(Kf ) = c+ rf + δ. It is decreasing with δ, while Ki is increasing
(recall that r˜i
ν
= c + δ). It results that qwf decreases more rapidly than Kf . As displayed in
Figure 1, in case (b), thermal and wind power capacities substitute each other when the social
cost of carbon increases: Kf decreases and Ki increases with δ.
With an additional increase in δ we reach case (c) where only one source of energy is used
in a given state of nature: wind power covers the whole demand in state w and fossil-fueled
high wind probability ν, and/or very high fossil fuel variable cost c.
18Note that case (b) would not show up with homogeneous costs ri and unbounded capacity K¯ for wind
power, as in Ambec and Crampes (2012, Proposition 3 and Figure 3).
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power in state w¯. Thermal power is forced out of dispatching in state w. Capacities result
from a fixed-point relationship between the marginal surplus S
′
(.) and the marginal cost of
green energy. Marginal surplus must be the same in both states of nature because of the
non reactivity constraint Ki = Kf . It equates the marginal costs of providing energy:
r˜i
ν
in state w and c + δ +
rf
1−ν in state w¯, which is (1− ν) (c+ δ) + rf + r˜i on average. The
fixed-point condition is K¯F (r˜i) = D ((1− ν) (c+ δ) + rf + r˜i) to determine r˜i, then Ki, then
Kf . The investment in Ki that was increasing with the social cost of carbon in case (b) is
now decreasing. This is due to the non-reactivity of consumers to states of nature, which
forces capacity to match Kf = Ki in case (c). The two sources of energy are not anymore
substitute but rather complement. Therefore, as thermal power becomes more harmful to the
environment, less capacity of thermal power is installed, which in turn implies fewer equipment
producing from renewables. Electricity consumption has to be reduced, as do capacity and
production from both the clean and dirty sources of energy.
As a concluding remark, an important feature of intermittency with non-reactive con-
sumers is that the cost of thermal power equipment rf does not matter when comparing the
cost of the two sources of energy: investing in wind power is socially efficient if ri/ν < c + δ
(see case (b) in Proposition 1). This is because every kilowatt of wind power installed must be
backed-up with one kilowatt of thermal power. Thus, without storage, both sources of energy
need the same thermal power equipment. Equipment cost determines total consumption and
thermal power capacity Kf . If the output of converters were not intermittent, that is if they
were able to produce at full capacity anytime, the condition for investing in wind power would
be ri < c+δ+rf .
19 The cost rf would be saved for each kilowatt-hour by avoiding duplicating
production capacity.
3.2.2 Market outcome
In cases (a) and (b), competitive wholesale prices are pw = c+δ, pw¯ = c+δ+
rf
1− v . In case (a),
since all production comes from thermal power, we could have expected a non-contingent price
pw = pw¯ = c+δ+rf . However, at this price the green operators with cost
r˜i
ν < p
w = c+δ+rf
would enter. Actually, thermal plants can compete on the basis of their marginal operating
cost in state w, that is c + δ, since they have installed capacity to meet demand in state w
where they do not suffer from the competition of renewables. Then competition drives pw
19See Ambec and Crampes (2017) for a proof. Note the later condition cannot be directly derived from
Proposition 1 by simply considering ν → 1. This is because with one single state of nature, constraint (3) is
missing so that the maximization programs with and without intermittency are not comparable.
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Figure 2: Prices when the social cost of carbon varies
down to c+δ so that thermal power plants just balance their operating costs. In state w¯, that
occurs with probability 1 − ν, the peak price pw¯ = c + δ + rf1− ν allows thermal producers
to recoup their full costs. Finally, competition between suppliers cancels the margin they
could obtain from buying at prices pw and pw¯ and selling at price p: p = νpw + (1− ν) pw¯.
It results p = c + δ + rf , so that the demand by consumers D (p) just matches the optimal
supply Kf = S
′−1
(c+ rf + δ). The three prices p
w, pw¯, p, are increasing functions of δ. The
only difference between cases (a) and (b) is that, in case (b), pw = c+ δ >
ri
ν allows the most
efficient green producers to enter and produce in state w up to the point where r˜iν = p
w,
obliging thermal power plants to reduce production below capacity. The active wind power
producers, i.e. those with ri ≤ ri < r˜i, obtain inframarginal profits.
In case (c) the wholesale electricity prices are given by the conditions of zero marginal
profit for each type of producer in each state of nature. In state w, wind power producers
install capacity up to the threshold cost r˜ci = νp
w of the least profitable turbines. Remarkably,
r˜ci , implicitly defined by a fixed point condition, is decreasing with δ and so is p
w: a higher
carbon tax lower the price of wind power in case (c). In state w¯ where thermal power plants
are used at full capacity, the price of electricity pw¯ = c + δ +
rf
1− ν covers thermal power’s
capacity cost rf even though the plants are running only a part 1 − ν of the year. Those
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wholesale electricity prices yield a retail price p = νpw + (1− ν)pw¯ = r˜ci + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf ,
which is the social cost of the marginal kilowatt-hour on average over the period. It yields a
demand for electricity in both states of nature equal to D(r˜ci + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf ), equal to
the quantity produced at first best.
3.3 Energy mix with storage
3.3.1 Optimal quantities
Storing wind power in state w to supply electricity in state w¯ becomes socially optimal when it
is cheaper than the social cost of thermal power. Comparing the two cost defines the threshold
δd in Appendix A. In case (d) energy storage does not fully replace thermal power: due to
the increasing marginal cost of renewables, stored wind power complements thermal power
production in state w¯. For stored intermittent power, one kilowatthour supplied requires to
store λ−1 kWh of wind power (with λ−1 > 1) at a cost equal to the sum of the cost of storage
equipment rs and the marginal cost of wind power production r˜i/ν. Overall, the marginal
cost of one kilowatt supplied in state w¯ with stored wind power is λ−1
[
rs +
r˜i
ν
]
. Equalizing
the two marginal social costs determines the marginal cost r˜di that, in turn, determines the
wind power production capacity Ki = K¯F (r˜
d
i ). It is increasing with the social cost of carbon
δ. The same holds for storage capacity Ks because more wind power is produced and stored
as thermal power becomes more harmful to the environment. On the other hand, thermal
power capacity and production decrease with δ. In other words, the intermittent energy that
already monopolized state w is progressively invading state w¯ by means of storage, like a more
competitive technology located in one country would gain market shares in another thanks
to exports.
In case (e), the social cost of carbon is so high that thermal power is no longer in the
socially optimal mix. All electricity production comes from renewables available in state
w, with more than half (because of conversion losses) stored to supply in state w¯ the same
quantity than in state w, that is Ki − Ksν = λKs1− ν . The marginal cost of providing one
kilowatt-hour is
r˜ei
ν in state w and λ
−1
[
rs +
r˜ei
ν
]
in state w¯ as seen above.
3.3.2 Market outcome
With active storage operators, the two wholesale prices are linked by a no arbitrage condition.
Indeed, it costs rs to install one unit of capacity that allows to buy one unit of energy in state
w and sell λ < 1 units in state w¯. Then there is entry in the storage activity until profits
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vanish, that is λpw¯− pw− rs = 0. In state w, storage operators are buyers who compete with
retailers; in state w¯ they are sellers competing with thermal power producers.
In case (d), thermal producers are still active. Then the wholesale electricity price pw¯ must
cover their cost c + δ +
rf
1− ν . The retail price p reflects the marginal cost of producing one
kilowatt-hour anytime with the bundle of technologies: (i) wind power in state w (for both
final consumption and storage) and (ii) thermal output plus destored energy in state w¯. It is
increasing with δ, which implies that electricity consumption D(p) decreases with δ despite
an increased investment in renewables Ki.
In case (e), we still have pw =
r˜ei
ν in state w and, using the no-arbitrage condition in storage,
pw¯ = λ−1
[
r˜ei
ν
+ rs
]
. But now, the environmental cost is so high that λ−1
[
r˜ei
ν
+ rs
]
< c+δ+
rf
1−ν :
then, there is no place for thermal production.
The retail price p reflects the marginal cost of providing one kilowatt-hour regardless of
the state of nature using wind power and energy storage. It is
r˜ei
ν
in state w and λ−1
[
rs +
r˜ei
ν
]
in state w¯ as seen above. Then p = r˜ei + (1− ν)λ−1
[
r˜ei
ν
+ rs
]
. Demand at this price defines
the marginal green equipment with cost r˜ei , then wind power capacity is Ki = K¯F (r˜
e
i ). It is
strictly higher than the final consumption D(p) since a fraction Ks
ν
must be stored. Storage
capacity Ks is tailored on power production from renewables and demand according to the
non-reactivity constraint. In case (e), electricity is 100% renewable. The energy mix is
disconnected from the social cost of carbon.20
It is noteworthy that, in case (e), the relationship between electricity consumption D(p),
renewable capacity Ki and storage capacity Ks depends solely on two parameters: the energy
efficiency of storage λ and the load factor ν. Indeed, without thermal power, the non-reactivity
constraint (3) that determines consumption D(p) in the two states of nature becomes:
Ki − Ks
ν
=
λKs
1− ν , (10)
which implies Ki =
[
1 + 1−ν
λν
]
D(p), i.e production capacity exceeds consumption. The dif-
ference between Ki and D(p) is decreasing with energy efficiency λ and the load factor ν.
Electricity production is νKi = [ν + (1− ν)λ−1]D(p). It is always higher than consumption
as long as storage needs energy i.e. λ < 1. Similarly, we have Ks = (1−ν)λ−1D(p). Therefore
the amount of energy stored is higher than consumption if the energy lost with the storage
technology 1− λ is higher than the load factor ν. It is lower otherwise.21
20Recall that in our model only thermal power plants are emitting pollutants. We abstract from the carbon
footprint of windmills, storage facilities, grid expansion and anything else related to electricity provision.
21Without energy loss λ = 1, the relationship between capacities and consumption boils down to D(p) = νKi
(consumption equals production) and Ks = (1− ν)D(p) (energy stored equals total consumption in state w¯).
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4 Public policy
We now assume that greenhouse gas emissions cannot be taxed at the social cost of carbon
or capped while intermittent energy is socially desirable. It means that the market-based
provision of electricity inefficiently relies on the technology thermal. We investigate which
public policies are likely to implement the optimal energy mix under competition. Technically
speaking, we aim at implementing the capacities and productions determined in cases (b) to
(e) of Proposition 1 in an economy where equilibrium prices do not reflect the social cost
of carbon δ. We consider policies that are implemented worldwide: supports to renewables
such as feed-in tariffs (FIT) and Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), capacity markets and
support to energy storage equipments. Since our results are of the same flavor with FIT and
RPS, we focus on FIT in the main text and relegate our analysis of RPS in Appendix B.
4.1 Feed-in tariffs and consumption tax
Under FIT, public authorities commit to purchasing wind power at a given price pi per
kilowatt hour higher than the wholesale market price.22 FIT are usually financed by a tax
on electricity consumption that we will denote as t per kilowatt hour. The unit price paid by
consumers is thus p+ t. In most countries using this tool, the FIT pi and the tax t are linked
through a budget-balancing constraint: the difference between the price paid to wind-power
producers pi and the wholesale price of electricity pw must be covered by the tax revenue
collected from consumers. To keep things simple, we focus on cases (b) and (c) where large
scale storage is not profitable yet, as it corresponds to the current state of technologies. In
these cases, electricity consumption is equal to the thermal power capacity q = Kf , the tax
revenue is tKf , while the price gap p
i− pw is compensated on the νKi kilowatt hours of wind
power consumed within the same time period. Therefore the budget-balance constraint is:
tKf ≥ ν(pi − pw)Ki. (11)
We show that (11) must hold with a strict inequality to implement the first-best energy mix
without storage. Let us consider case (b) in Proposition 1. The FIT must be set to pi = c+ δ
in order to induce first-best investment in renewables, namely Ki = K¯F (ν(c+ δ)). However,
given the competitive wholesale prices without carbon tax or cap pw = c and pw¯ = c+
rf
1− ν ,
binding the budget constraint (11) with pi = c+ δ, leads to a tax rate of t = νKi
Kf
δ. Under this
22A milder form of green subsidy is the feed-in premium (FIP) which is a subsidy to wind power production
on top of the market price. In our model, FIT and FIP are equivalent.
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tax rate, given that the zero-profit condition of the retailers yields a retail price p = c + rf ,
the post-tax retail price is p + t = c + rf +
νKi
Kf
δ, which is strictly lower than the one that
implements first-best, namely c + rf + δ (see case (b) in Proposition 1). Electricity is too
cheap which results in over-consumption of thermal powered electricity and over-investment
in thermal power capacity. For the right price signal to be sent to final consumers, the tax rate
must be such that p+t = c+rf +δ, which leads to a tax rate of t = δ >
νKi
Kf
δ, thereby inducing
a budget surplus, i.e. the budget-balance constraint (11) is met with a strict inequality.
The same reasoning carries out in cases (c) and (d): as compared to first best, a FIT
induces too much electricity production as long as thermal power plants are active. The tax
that finances the FIT is not high enough to reduce thermal power production at the efficient
level. The tax rate should reflect its social cost. It is only when the socially efficient energy
mix is carbon-free (case (e)) that it can be implemented with FIT combined with a support
to energy storage (see Section 4.3 below).
Incentive-based fiscal policies aiming at mitigating pollution externalities generate a bud-
get surplus that has to be assigned to stakeholders without altering their behavior (e.g. redis-
tributed to consumers in a way unrelated to their energy consumption). Similarly, a surplus
is generated with the next policy we consider which combines a price cap with capacity pay-
ments. We will show that the surplus can be assigned to thermal power producers or electricity
retailers depending on whether the payments are auctioned or set by the regulator.
4.2 Feed-in tariffs and capacity payment to thermal plants
Instead of launching a Pigouvian carbon tax, governments can use two instruments (in ad-
dition to a FIT financed by a tax on consumption) to implement the efficient energy mix
without storage : a price cap on electricity and capacity payments. Indeed capping electricity
price on the wholesale market to p¯ with c < p¯ < c +
rf
1−ν would put the thermal power pro-
ducers out of business as they would not be able to recoup their equipment cost. However,
a subsidy for each kilowatt of capacity up to a level defined by the regulator can bring them
back into business. Setting the maximal capacity eligible to subsidies to the first-best level
Kf = D(c+ rf + δ) would ensure that producers invest at first-best. Hence, the over-supply
of thermal powered electricity induced by FIT can be compensated by lowering the thermal
power producers’ profit in state w¯ with a price cap while, at the same time, increasing it by
remunerating investment in capacity up to a level that would implement first-best. Capping
the energy price and subsidizing the installed capacity is now a public policy often observed
in the electricity industry. The proof is straightforward given the equilibrium conditions that
determine prices and quantities. Let’s see how to determine the capacity payment that imple-
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ments first-best for a given price cap in case (b). Case (c) proceeds similarly and is therefore
omitted.
Under this policy regime, wholesale prices fluctuate between pw = c in state w and the
price cap pw¯ = p¯ in state w¯. Production is at first-best as (i) wind energy converters have
priority in the merit order in state w and (ii) thermal plants supply electricity in state w¯ with
the capacity limited to the first-best level. Let us denote the capacity payment per kilowatt
by σf . With those wholesale prices, the profit of the thermal power producers includes the
revenue net of operating cost p¯−c from the (1−ν)Kf megawatt-hours of electricity produced
minus the capacity cost net of the subsidy rf−σf from the Kf megawatts of capacity required,
that is (1− ν)(p¯− c)Kf − (rf − σf )Kf . Auctioned capacity payments would drive down this
profit to zero, which yields a capacity payment of:
σf = rf − (1− ν)(p¯− c). (12)
Thermal power production capacity determines the retail electricity price which matches
demand at first-best Kf = D(c+ rf + δ). The final price paid by consumers, which includes
the tax t that finances the FIT and the subsidy σf to be paid to thermal power producers,
bowls down to p+ t+ σf = c+ rf + δ (see case b). Using t =
νKi
Kf
δ to cover the FIT and (12)
to balance the budget of thermal producers, we obtain the retail electricity price:
p = νc+ (1− ν)p¯+
(
1− νKi
Kf
)
δ.
With auctioned capacity payments defined in (12), electricity retailers take advantage of the
limited support to capacity by enjoying a profit of p− (νpw + (1−ν)p¯) =
(
1− νKi
Kf
)
δ on each
kilowatt-hour. Alternatively, a capacity payment set by the regulator as in Spain (see Fabra,
2018) is likely to allow thermal power producers to gain a positive profit at the expense of
electricity retailers. The level of σf determines how producers and retailers are sharing the
surplus from capacity scarcity induced by the price cap.23
4.3 Feed-in tariffs and capacity payments to storage plants
When storage is socially efficient, another policy must be added: a subsidy on storage equip-
ments. We show that the optimal energy mix with renewables, thermal power and storage,
i.e. case (d), can be implemented by combining FIT (and the associated tax on consumption)
with a price cap and capacity mechanism to both thermal power and storage equipment. The
same reasoning carries out for RPS (see Appendix B).
23It is worth noting that the choice of the price cap p¯ does not impact profits, only σf does.
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First, a FIT of pi =
r˜di
ν induces first-best investment in wind power. Second, paying σf
as defined in (12) for every kilowatt of thermal capacity up to the socially optimal capacity
Kf defined in Proposition 1(d) makes sure that the thermal power plants are financially
sustainable for every price cap p¯ such that c < p¯ < c+
rf
1− ν . Third, the profit per kilowatt-
hour to storage operators who buy electricity in state w at price pw and sell it in state w¯ at
price pw¯ is:
pw¯ − λ−1 [pw + rs − σs] , (13)
where σs denotes the payment per kilowatt-hour of storage capacity. Since wholesale market
prices are pw = c and pw¯ = p¯, subsidizing the Ks kilowatt-hours of storage capacity defined
in Proposition 1(d) with a payment σs = c + rs − λp¯ per kilowatt-hour equalizes the storage
operator’s profit in (13) to zero. Hence the mechanism raises funds to finance the needed
storage capacity, and any extra investment in storage is not profitable. As for thermal power
capacity, it can reached by auctioning the subsidized storage capacity: the competitive bid is
then σs defined above.
Next, we move to the efficient energy mix without thermal power described in Proposition
1(e). As before, a FIT of pi =
r˜ei
ν induces optimal investment in renewables. To obtain
first-best, thermal power plants must be excluded from electricity provision. It can be done
by taxing thermal power equipments (instead of subsidizing them) to make them unprofitable
or by banning fossil-fueled electricity. Getting rid of fossil fuel is enough to obtain first-
best. With only wind power and storage, the electricity prices on the wholesale and retail
market defined in Proposition 1(e) satisfy the zero-profit conditions of the least profitable wind
power producers, storage operators and electricity retailers. Hence, investment, production
and consumption are optimal.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The optimal energy mix can be implemented by combining support to renew-
ables such as feed-in tariffs (financed by a tax on consumption) and renewable portfolio stan-
dards with a price cap and volume-limited capacity payments for thermal power and storage
equipments.
Recall that in our model there is only one type of energy storage technology and one type
of fossil-fueled power generation. With heterogeneous technologies, a uniform subsidization
policy can distort investment decisions by increasing the profits of infra-marginal plants, then
modify the energy mix. Consequently, any attempt to generalize Proposition 2 should take
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account of differentiated levels of emissions from thermal plants and different conversion losses
in storage devices.
Another limitation is due to how we model uncertainty. With one single parameter ν to
represent the lack of reliability of intermittent renewables, we cannot analyze subtle changes in
the provision of renewables such as mean-preserving spread. With highly variable renewables
availability, the type of generation backup and/or storage needed to meet the needs of non-
responsive consumers are quite different than what is required to compensate low variance.
Then the capacity mechanism to implement should depend on the uncertainty characteristics.
5 Conclusion
Climate change mitigation requires the replacement of fossil-fuel energy with renewables such
as wind and solar power. It has been fostered through diverse policies implemented world-
wide, from carbon tax to feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards. The intermit-
tent nature of renewables, coupled with the lack of consumers’ responsiveness to short-term
fluctuations in electricity provision, makes it necessary to back-up any new installation of
intermittent energy facilities (e.g. new windmills) with reliable energy (e.g. coal power plants
and/or storage). As a result, fossil fuel and renewables are not substitutes in all states of
nature. They are indeed substitutes every time the wind is blowing. But when there is no
wind and consumers still want power, thermal technology is the indispensable complement to
wind turbines, at least until storage becomes cheap enough and carbon expensive enough to
make renewables the exclusive source of electricity production.
Because of the intermittency of renewables, the impact of environmental policies is by
no means trivial. In particular, the support to renewables through feed-in tariffs (FIT) or
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) results in too much thermal power production. Thermal
power can be contained with a price cap and capacity payment. When carefully designed,
both instruments in addition to FIT or RPS allow to implement the socially efficient energy
mix for electricity generation.
Technological innovations provide solutions to the intermittency of renewable sources of
energy. Our model allows to identify the components of their social value. Energy storage, in
batteries or by pumping water into upstream reservoirs, reduces the burden of intermittency
by transferring energy from low-value to high-value dates or states of nature. The marginal
value of energy storage depends on the cost difference between intermittent and reliable
sources of energy and on energy conversion losses. It is reflected by the difference in electricity
prices on the wholesale market. Private investment in storage is efficient when the social cost
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of carbon is embedded in wholesale prices. Otherwise, storage should be subsidized to reward
greenhouse gas emission saving. It is only when thermal power can be left out of the market
that FIT or RPS are enough to induce optimal investment in storage facilities.
More can be done within our framework. First, other sources of intermittent energy can be
considered. The diversification of energy sources is indeed a technological solution to mitigate
intermittency. Wind energy converters can be spread out in different regions to take advan-
tage of diverse weather conditions and thus increase the number of days with significant wind
power. But this spatial dispersion requires investment in transmission. Other intermittent
sources such as tide or wave power can be used to increase the supply of energy by reduc-
ing overall intermittency. Our model can be extended to accommodate several intermittent
sources of energy with heterogeneous costs and occurrences. Using a similar model, Ambec
and Crampes (2012) have shown that it is optimal to invest in two different intermittent
sources of energy that do not produce at the same time, even if one is more costly. Similarly,
in this paper investing in wind power at different locations, or in tide or wave power, would
reduce the probability of relying only on thermal power. Yet as long as global intermittent
production remains a random variable, our analysis is qualitatively valid since intermittent en-
ergy capacity must be backed up with thermal power facilities or complemented with storage
and demand response.
Lastly, our analysis ignores several important issues related to the transition to decarbon-
ating electricity generation: the variability of demand for electricity and its adequacy with the
supply from intermittent energy sources, the phasing out of fossil-fueled equipments and the
resulting stranded costs, the flexibility of reliable sources of energy including their starting,
stopping and ramping costs, as well as the re-designing of the transmission infrastructure.
These issues could be addressed using an extension of our framework.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
A.1 Optimal quantities
Denoting γ, µ
f
, µf , µi, µf and µs the multipliers respectively associated with the constraints
(4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9), the Lagrange function corresponding to the program can be
written as
L = ν
[
S
(
K¯F (r˜i) + q
w
f −
Ks
ν
)
− (c+ δ) qwf + µfqwf + µf (Kf − qwf ) + µi (r˜i − ri)
]
+νγ
(
K¯F (r˜i) + q
w
f −
Ks
ν
−Kf − λKs
1− ν
)
+(1− ν)
[
S
(
Kf +
λKs
1− ν
)
− (c+ δ)Kf
]
−rfKf − K¯
∫ r˜i
ri
ridF (ri) + µfKf − rsKs + µsKs
Given the linearity of technologies and the concavity of the surplus function, the following
first-order conditions are sufficient to determine the optimal levels of capacity and output:
qwf : ν
[
S ′(.)− (c+ δ) + µ
f
− µf + γ
]
= 0 (14)
Kf : ν [µ¯f − γ] + (1− ν) [S ′(.)− (c+ δ)]− rf + µf = 0 (15)
r˜i : ν
[
S ′(.) + µ′
i
+ γ
]
− r˜i = 0 (16)
Ks : −S ′(.)(1− λ)− γ
[
1 +
νλ
1− ν
]
+ µs − rs = 0 (17)
where µ′
i
≡ µ
i
/Kf (r˜i), S
′(.) denotes S ′
(
K¯F (r˜i) + q
w
f − Ksν
)
= S ′
(
Kf +
λKs
1− ν
)
, plus the
complementary slackness conditions derived from the five inequality constraints (5) to (9).
Combining (14) and (16) yields:
r˜i
ν
= µf + µ
′
i
− µ
f
+ c+ δ. (18)
Furthermore, combining (14) and (15) leads to:
γ = µf − rf − (1− ν)µf + µf . (19)
a. First, without intermittent energy (case a in Proposition 1), we have that r˜i = ri and
µ
′
i
≥ 0. Also Kf > 0 by (2) so that µf = 0. Moreover, since K¯F (r˜i) = 0, the non-reactivity
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condition (4) implies qwf = Kf +Ks
[
1
ν
+ λ
1−ν
]
, which, combined with qwf ≤ Kf , implies Ks = 0
and qwf = Kf , and therefore µf = 0 and µf ≥ 0. Hence, condition (18) implies
ri
ν
≥ c + δ.
Since this is a necessary condition for Ki = 0, by contraposition
δ ≥ δb def= ri
ν
− c (20)
is sufficient for Ki > 0.
Substituting qwf = Kf > 0 and K¯F (r˜i) = 0 into (14) yields µf − γ = S ′(Kf ) − (c+ δ)
which, combined with (15) where µf = 0, leads to Kf = S
′−1 (c+ δ + rf ).
b. With investment in intermittent energy Ki > 0, we have r˜i > ri and µ
′
i
= 0 in (18)
which becomes r˜i
ν
= µf − µf + c + δ. Let us assume first that qwf > 0 (case b). Moreover,
the non-reactivity constraint with Ki > 0 and Ks = 0 implies q
w
f < Kf , hence µf = 0. Thus
the investment in renewables is given by r˜iν = c + δ. Next, (19) with µf = µf = 0 leads to
γ = µf − rf . Substituting γ into (15) and (17) yields:
c+ δ + rf =
1
1− λ
[(
rf − µf
)(
1 +
λν
1− ν
)
+ µs − rs
]
. (21)
Since µs and µf are the only endogenous variables in (21), except for very specific param-
eter values, we cannot have both multipliers nil at the same time. Therefore if µf = 0 then
µs > 0: no storage is installed when Kf > q
w
f > 0. Equation (19) with µf = µf = µf = 0
leads to γ = −rf . The non-reactivity constraint (3) with Ks = 0 yields the installed capacity
of thermal power Kf = Ki + q
w
f = S
′−1 (c+ δ + rf ) as well as the production of fossil energy
in state w, qwf = Kf −Ki = S ′−1 (c+ δ + rf )− K¯F (ν (c+ δ)) given the cost r˜iν = c+ δ of the
marginal investment in renewables.
Let ∆c (δ) ≡ S ′−1 (c+ δ + rf ) − K¯F (ν(c+ δ)) > 0. Since ∆′c (δ) < 0 and ∆c (0) =
S ′−1 (c+ rf ) > 0, we have that ∆c (δ) > 0 for every δ < δc, where δc is uniquely defined
by ∆c(δ
c) = 0, that is:
K¯F (ν (c+ δc)) = S ′−1 (c+ rf + δc) . (22)
Hence Kf > q
w
f > 0 for δ < δ
c, and qwf = 0 for δ ≥ δc whenever Ks = 0.
c. Suppose now that δ ≥ δc and Ks = 0 so that qwf = 0 and Kf > 0 (case c). Then
µf = µf = 0, which in (19) yields γ = −(1 − ν)µf − rf . Substitute it into (15) and (16) to
obtain µ
f
= − r˜iν + (c+ δ) which, in (14) leads to S ′(.) = (1− ν) (c+ δ) + r˜i + rf . Using the
non-reactivity constraint (3) with Ks = 0, we thus obtain:
S ′(Ki) = S ′(Kf ) = (1− ν) (c+ δ) + r˜i + rf , (23)
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Substituting Ki = K¯F (r˜i) = Kf in (23) yields:
K¯F (r˜i
c) = Kf = S
′−1 ((1− ν) (c+ δ) + r˜ic + rf ) , (24)
which determines both Kf and r˜i
c, the latter being a fixed point in the relationship. It clearly
depends on the value of δ.
Substituting S ′(.) = (1 − ν) (c+ δ) + r˜ic + rf and (from (16)) S ′(.) + γ = r˜
c
i
ν into (17)
shows that µs > 0 (no investment in storage) as long as:(
r˜ci
ν
+ rs
)
λ−1 > c+ δ +
rf
1− ν (25)
Let δd be the value of δ for which (25) holds as an equality. Differentiating (24) shows that r˜ci
is decreasing with δ and, therefore, the left-hand side of (25) is also decreasing with δ while
the right-hand side is increasing with δ which shows that δd is unique.
d. Assume now δ > δd so that (25) is reversed and therefore Ks > 0. Knowing that
µs = µf = µ
′
i
= µf = 0, conditions (15), (16) and (17) joint with (3) are a set of four
equations to determine the four unknowns: Kf , Ki, Ks and γ. Like in paragraph c. above, we
have that S ′(.) + γ = r˜iν and S
′(.) = (1− ν) (c+ δ) + rf + r˜i. Inserting these two values into
(17) we obtain the cost of the less efficient intermittent plant:
r˜di = λν
[
c+ δ +
rf
1− ν
]
− νrs (26)
and the associated volumeKi = K¯F (r˜
d
i ). Using (26) and S
′
(
Ki − Ksν
)
= (c+δ)(1−ν)+rf+r˜di
we can determine the storage capacity:
S ′
(
Ki − Ks
ν
)
= (1− ν (1− λ))
[
c+ δ +
rf
1− ν
]
− νrs.
Finally, using these values and the non-reactivity constraint (3), we derive the thermal
investment Kf = Ki −
(
1
ν
+ λ
1−ν
)
Ks. Note that since S
” < 0, Ki − Ksν is decreasing with δ,
whereas Ks is increasing. We deduce that the optimal thermal capacity must decrease when
δ increases. This zone ends out when Kf = 0, that is when δ is equal to the threshold δ
e such
that:
δe
def
= arg
[
S ′−1
(
(c+ δ)(1− ν) + rf + r˜di
)
=
λν
1− ν + λν K¯F (r˜
d
i )
]
,
where r˜di is defined in (26).
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e. Finally, let us consider the case δ > δe and thus Kf = 0 = q
w
f while Ks > 0 (storage
without thermal power). The non-reactivity constraint (3) yields:
Ks =
ν (1− ν)
1− ν + λνKi. (27)
Next, by combining (16) and (17), we obtain:
S ′(.) = r˜i + (1− ν)λ−1
[
rs +
r˜i
ν
]
.
Using the non-reactivity constraint (3), we get:
Ki − Ks
ν
= S
′−1
(
r˜i + (1− ν)λ−1
[
rs +
r˜i
ν
])
.
Combining the above relationship with (27) and Ki = K¯F (r˜i) we obtain the equation that
defines the cost of the optimal marginal equipment in renewable energy r˜ei as a fixed point:
K¯F (r˜ei ) = S
′−1 (r˜ei (1 + 1−νλν )+ 1−νλ rs) [1 + 1−νλν ] .
A.2 Competitive prices
In a competitive framework, unit prices p, pw and pw¯ are independent of individual decisions.
We assume that carbon emissions are taxed at their social cost δ per unit.
A.2.1 Agents’ plans
• Thermal producers earn pif = ν (pw − c− δ) qwf + (1− ν) (pw − c− δ)Kf − rfKf , qwf ≤
Kf .
(i) Whenever pw > c+δ they fix qwf = Kf and they earn pif = [νp
w + (1− ν)pw − (c+ δ + rf )]Kf .
Then, if νpw + (1− ν)pw > c+ δ + rf , they fix Kf > 0; otherwise Kf = 0.
(ii) Whenever pw < c+δ they fix qwf = 0 and they earn pif = [(1− v) (pw − c− δ)− rf ]Kf .
Then if pw > c+ δ +
rf
1−v they fix Kf > 0; otherwise Kf = 0.
(iii) Whenever pw = c + δ they fix any value qwf ∈ [0, Kf ] , Kf > 0 if pw ≥ c + δ + rf1−v
and Kf = 0 otherwise.
• Renewable producers earn pii = νpwK¯F (ri)− K¯
∫ ri
ri
xdF (x), ri ≥ ri. Their best choice
is given by νpw = ri if vp
w > ri; Otherwise, Ki = 0
• Storage operators install Ks, fill it with a flow sw during each of the hw hours of the
w (low price) period and empty it with a flow sw during each of the hw hours of the
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w (high price) period. Then they earn pis = −rsKs − pwhwsw + pwhwsw constrained
by hwsw ≤ Ks and hwsw ≤ λhwsw. Saturating the constraints, the profit function is
pis = (λp
w − pw − rs)Ks. The best choice is Ks > 0 if λpw − pw > rs; otherwise Ks = 0.
• Consumers earn S(q)− pq. They buy q = D(p) def= S ′−1(p) ≥ 0
• Retailers earn pir = (p− νpw − (1− ν)pw) q. They operate as long as p ≥ νpw+(1−ν)pw.
• Equilibrium conditions q = K¯F (r˜i) + qwf − Ksν = Kf − λKs1−ν
• Free entry condition: in each market segment profit is 0 for the last firm in.
A.2.2 Parameterized equilibrium
• Case (a): When δ < ri
ν
− c, to obtain Ki = 0, q = qwf = Kf = S ′−1(c + rf + δ), Ks = 0 we
need pw = c+ δ, pw = c+ δ+
rf
1−ν , p = c+ rf + δ. Indeed, p
w <
ri
ν
allows to keep unprofitable
renewables out of the market. Thermal plants produce at full capacity in state w but they
earn a zero operating profit. This is why pw must be high enough to reimburse the fixed
cost during period w. The price p paid by consumers matches the long run marginal cost
(including the environmental cost δ per kilowatt-hour) and allows retailers to balance their
budget.
p = νpw + (1− ν)pw = c+ rf + δ. (28)
Capacity is determined by demand at this price Kf = D(c+ δ+ rf ). Finally, with a high cost
of storage equipment rs and a low conversion efficiency λ, the gains in state w are not large
enough to have λ
rf
1−ν − (1− λ) (c+ δ)− rs ≥ 0. Then Ks = 0.
• Case (b): Prices are the same as in the former case. But now, since δ > ri
ν
− c, we have
pw >
ri
ν
so that entrepreneurs invest in renewables up to the point where r˜i = νp
w = ν (c+ δ).
In state w thermal plants provide the difference qwf = Kf −Ki and get a zero operating profit,
which necessitates pw = c + δ +
rf
1−ν to recoup the fixed cost in state w. Investment in wind
power is Ki = K¯F (ν(c+ δ)). Investment in thermal power adjusts to demand D(p) with the
retail price defined in (28), which yields Kf = D(c + δ + rf ). It shows that, as δ increases,
investment in wind power Ki also increases, whereas thermal power capacity Kf decreases.
24
As for storage operators, entry is even less profitable than in case (a) since their unit margin
λ
rf
1−ν − (1− λ) (c+ δ)− rs decreases with δ.
24Formally, by differentiating wind and thermal power capacities with respect to δ, we obtain dKidδ =
K¯f(ν(c+ δ))ν > 0 and
dKf
dδ = D
′(c+ δ + rf ) < 0.
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• Case (c): When only wind power is used in state w, the zero-profit condition for the less
efficient converter (with cost r˜ci per kilowatt-hour) yields:
pw =
r˜ci
ν
(29)
Thermal power producers are producing only in state w¯ because pw < c+ δ. Their zero-profit
condition per kilowatt-hour writes (1− ν)pw¯ = (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf . Then again
pw¯ = c+ δ +
rf
1− ν . (30)
The zero-profit condition per kilowatt-hour for electricity retailers p = νpw + (1− ν)pw¯, with
wholesale electricity prices pw and pw¯ defined in (29) and (30) respectively, yields a retail
price equal to
p = r˜i + (1− ν)(c+ δ) + rf
Investment in both sources of energy are driven by the above retail price: Ki = Kf = D(p) =
D(r˜i + (1 − ν)(c + δ) + rf ) which defines r˜ci . Both investments Ki and Kf decrease when δ
increases. Again storage is not profitable because pw + rs > λp
w¯.
• Case (d): By buying energy in state w to sell it in state w¯, storage operators push pw up
and pw down to pw¯ = c + δ +
rf
1−ν which is necessary to balance the budget of the thermal
power producers. Entry stops when the zero-profit condition per kilowatt-hour is reached:
λpw¯ − pw = rs. (31)
Combining with pw¯ we obtain pw = λ
(
c+ δ +
rf
1−ν
) − rs. Given this price, we deduce the
marginal operator of green production: r˜di = νp
w. The zero-profit condition for retailers
determines the retail price of electricity p = (1− ν + νλ) (c+ δ + rf
1−ν
) − νrs, then demand
D(p) and capacities Ks and Kf .
• Case (e): To keep thermal producers out of activity, we now need pw¯ < c+δ+ rf
1−ν . As in case
(d) the zero-profit condition for the less efficient turbine yields pw =
r˜ei
ν
while the zero-profit
condition for the storage facility leads to pw¯ = λ−1
[
r˜ei
ν
+ rs
]
. The zero-profit condition for
retailers yields the retail price of electricity p. Since Kf = 0, all these values are related by:
S
′
(
λKs
1− ν
)
= S
′
(
K¯F (r˜i)− Ks
ν
)
= p = νpw + (1− ν) pw¯ = r˜ei + (1− ν)λ−1
[
r˜ei
ν
+ rs
]
.
B Renewable portfolio standards
Another popular instrument to foster investment in renewable sources of energy is the Renew-
able Portfolio Standard (RPS), also called renewable energy obligation (Schmalensee, 2012).
28
Under this regime, electricity retailers are obliged to purchase a given share of ”green” elec-
tricity. They are required to purchase Renewable Energy Credits (REC) or green certificates
produced by state-certified renewable generators, which guarantees that the targeted share is
achieved. For each kilowatt-hour sold, renewable energy producers issue a REC. Retailers and
big consumers are required to buy enough credits to meet their target. In our model, a RPS
defines a share α < 1 of energy consumption Kf that must be supplied with an intermittent
source of energy Ki, that is α =
vKi
Kf
. Wind producers issue REC that they sell to electricity
suppliers at price g. They thus obtain pw+g per kWh where pw is the wholesale price in state
w. Retailers buy αq REC in addition to electricity in the wholesale market when supplying
q kilowatt-hour to final consumers.
Under RPS, the zero-profit conditions per kilowatt-hour for the less efficient wind power
producers (with cost r˜i) and for electricity suppliers are respectively:
pw + g =
r˜i
ν
, (32)
p = ν
[
pw + g
Ki
Kf
]
+ (1− ν)pw¯. (33)
Investment in production capacity by wind power producers is such that the return they get
per kWh pw + g is equal to the long run marginal cost of the less efficient converter r˜i/ν as
shown in (32). Retailers transfer the additional cost of producing electricity from renewables
to consumers by increasing electricity prices by ν KiKf
g = αg.
Wholesale prices of electricity pw and pw¯ are determined by the thermal power production
costs. On windy days, thermal power plants are running below capacity so that the price of
electricity matches their operating cost pw = c (recall there is no Pigou tax). The equipment
cost is covered in state w¯ with a wholesale market price pw¯ = c +
rf
1− ν . Replacing the
wholesale prices by their values into (32) and (33) yields:
g =
r˜i
ν
− c, (34)
p = c+ rf + α
[
r˜i
ν
− c
]
. (35)
According to condition (34), the price of RECs should compensate for the difference between
marginal costs of the two sources of energy, given that thermal power plants are used below
capacity. It equals the opportunity cost of using wind power rather than thermal power to
produce electricity in state w. Condition (35) gives the price of electricity paid by consumers
as a function of the RPS, α. The mark-up on the thermal power long-term marginal cost is
equal to the opportunity cost of wind power for its mandatory share on electricity supply, α.
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The above analysis shows that the RPS disentangles the value of each kWh of renewable
source of energy from wholesale prices. By selling a REC, wind power producers obtain more
than the price of electricity in the wholesale market. Competitive electricity retailers, who are
obliged by law to buy green certificates, pass this mark-up on wholesale prices to consumers,
by increasing the retail price. The premium paid by consumers depends on the RPS, both
directly, through the quantity of green certificates per kWh α, and indirectly via the price of
those certificates g which increases with α.
The optimal energy mix without storage (case (b) in Proposition 1) can be implemented
by means of RPS combined with a tax on electricity consumption. Setting the RPS α to
foster first-best investment in renewables Ki = K¯F (ν(c + δ) in case (b) of Proposition 1
determines the cost of the marginal wind turbine r˜i = ν(c + δ). It leads to a retail price
p = c + rf + αδ in (35). It is strictly lower than the one inducing first-best electricity
consumption p = c + rf + δ as α < 1. As a result, too much electricity using fossil fuel will
be produced. A tax on electricity consumption set at the level t = δ (1− α) leads to retailing
price p + t = c + rf + αδ + (1 − α)δ = c + rf + δ, which is the price that induces first-best
consumption (see Proposition 1(b)).
The optimal energy mix without storage can also be implemented by means of RPS com-
bined with a price cap and volume-limited capacity payments. Capping wholesale electricity
price by p¯ with c < p¯ < c +
rf
1− v and subsidizing Kf = D(c + rf + δ) kilowatts of capacity
at a rate σf defined in (12) would implement first-best under RPS with α =
vKi
Kf
where
Ki = K¯F (ν(c+ δ)) and Kf = D(c+ rf + δ) as defined in Proposition 1(b).
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